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DESIGNING AN OPTIMAL PERSONAL
INCOME TAX RATE STRUCTURE:
GOALS AND CRITERIA
By

VLADIMIR SALZYN**

I. INTRODUCTION
In order to design a rational tax rate structure and to resolve
conflicts, it is important not only to be aware of the choices
available but also to understand the public policy goals being sought.
This paper begins by explaining the prevailing views on social
choice decision-making and ways of achieving consensus, with the
objective of establishing the broad social goals that Canadians want.
In Part III, these goals are applied to the specific objectives of
economic efficiency and social justice in the design of an optimal tax
rate structure. Part IV explains the types of rate structures available
and examines their technical characteristics. The ways in which the
goal of social justice in tax rate design might be achieved are set out
in Part V. Part VI deals with trade-offs and compromises. Parts
VII and VIII set out the rates recommended by the Royal
Commission on Taxation and compare them with the current rate
structures.

Copyright, 1988, Vladimir Salzyn.
**Department of Economics, University of Alberta.
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II. THE GOALS
Although in tax design "it is of fundamental importance that
the goals ... be made clear,"1 this is not an easy task. The public

goals of tax policy are of a social nature. They represent what
society as a whole wants. In order to find out what society wants it
is imperative to start with the most basic goals that are accepted by
all. Only after these goals have been established can they be
applied to the specific objectives of tax policy. This assures that the
objectives of tax policy are always consistent with the underlying
goals of society.
A. Approaches to Social Choice Decision-making
There are a variety of theories of the best way of
determining what society wants. Philosophically these theories range
from holding that governments should seek only those objectives that
are unanimously approved by every single person in society, to
"social consensus" approaches, which accept that all social goals need
not be supported by every single member of society, so long as they
represent the preferences of most members.
One example of the "unanimous" approach to social choice
is the fiscal exchange theory advocated by Nobel Prize winner James
Buchanan. 2 This approach, shown as Route A on Figure 1,
maximizes personal rights and freedoms but is much too restrictive
on a wide range of desirable government activities.
Most economists favour social consensus theories, such as the
one developed by Burk and explicated by Samuelson, which takes
fully into account the utility-maximizing self-interest of every single
individual in society.3 However, there are many problems with this
I Quebec, Ministry of Finance, White Paperon thepersonaltax and transfersystems Qu6bec:
Ministtre des finances, 1984) at 5.
2

One example of Buchanan's views is: G. Brennan & J.M. Buchanan, The Power to Tat:
Analytical Foundationsof a Fiscal Constitution (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

3A. Burk, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics" (1938) 52 Q.J.
Econ. 310. P.A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge:
University Press, 1947).
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type of "social welfare" approach (Route B, Figure 1), including the
fact that it can be used to support quite perverse social goals that
maximize total utility. For example, it has been demonstrated that
this approach can lead to starving4 and torturing people to increase
5
social welfare!
Other social consensus approaches (Route c, Figure 1) do
not depend on individual self-interest but are based upon what6
Mishan calls "ethical considerations", guided by what is right or just.
In support of this approach, Thurow argues that "individual
preferences are still totalled but the relevant individualpreferences are

of a different type"7 - not the self-centred, utility-maximizing type.
B. Reaching Consensus
There never was, and there never can be, unanimous
agreement on what is the best social choice theory or what our
social goals should be. No amount of philosophizing will ever justify
ultimate values in society. As Fisher notes, we should expect some8
philosophical doubt to remain with any practical social decision.
According to Dorfman, it is not necessary to have proof that any
given social goal is the right one, but9 only that there is some wellfounded consensus on its desirability.

4

M. Ricketts, 'Tax Theory and Tax Policy" in A. Peacock & F. Forte, eds., The Political
Economy of Taxation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) 29 at 38.
5
A. Sen, "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements:
Economics" (1979) 39 Econ. J. 537 at 547-48.

Or What is Wrong with Welfare

6

E.J. Mishan, Introduction to Nonnative Economics (New York: Oxford University Press,
1981) at 130.
7

L.C. Thurow, Dangerous Currents: The State of Economics (New York: Random House,
1983) at 224.
8

F. Fischer, Politics, Values, and Public Policy: The Problem of Methodology (Boulder.
Westview Press, 1980) at 153.
9

R. Dorfman, "An Afterword: Human Values and Environmental Decisions" in L.H.
Tribe, C.S. Schelling & J. Voss, eds., Wen Values Conflict; Essays on EnvironmentalAnalysis,
Discourse, and Decision (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1976) at 168.
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It has been argued by Rawls that this consensus would
10

emerge if decisions were made from "behind a veil of ignorance."

Individuals would choose goals as though they had no knowledge of
In this way, O'Kelley argues,

their own personal preferences.

agreement would be "arrived at impartially."' - Also, as Head shows,
if a particular goal cannot be established as being "ethically
desirable", then being "acceptable" may have to suffice, and in some
cases being "politically operational" may be the best that be
expected.1 2
C. The Social Goals of Canadians

It has been argued that the search for social goals begins "by
considering a hypothetical original position where representative

[persons] gather to agree."13 What "representative" Canadians want
can be

ascertained

government, 14

the

by examining

courts, 15

Royal

have studied these issues.1 7

made

statements

Commissions, 16

by the

and others who

Although there is no unanimous

10 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap, 1971) at 12.
11

C.R. O'Kelley, Jr., "Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax" (1981) 16 Georgia L. Rev. at

19.
12

J.G. Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare (Durham: Duke University Press, 1974)
at 511-18.
13

0'Kelley, supra, note 11 at 18.

14
Hon. E.J. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposalsfor Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1969) at 6-7 [hereinafter Proposals]; Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech
(Ottawa: 18 June 1971) at 3; Canada, Department of Finance, Guidelinesfor Tax Reform in
Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1986) at 3-4 [hereinafter Guidelines].
15
Statement by Mr. Justice Estey in Stubart Investments Limited v. Her Majesty the Queen
(1984) 84 D.T.C. 6305 at 6321-22.
16

Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report,vol. 2 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair: K. LeM. Carter) at 7 [hereinafter Report].
17
H.S. Gordon, The Demand and Supply of Government: What We Want and What We
Get (Discussion Paper No. 79) (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1977) at 9.
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agreement, there seems to be a relatively high level of consensus in
Canada on desirable social goals, at least in broad categories.
Allowing for variations in terminology and problems of precise
classification, three sets of underlying social goals appear to
predominate.
One set of goals is concerned with the nation as a whole,
involving the maximization of total economic well-being or welfare
in society through the efficient production of goods and services
desired by Canadians. Another set of social goals seeks a just
relationship both between people and between the government and
people. The third set of goals deals with the relationship of each
person to the state, and comprises, for instance, the preservation of
individual rights and freedom.
Thus, the social goals supported by most Canadians seem to
fall into the following categories: economic efficiency, social justice,
and the preservation of individual rights and freedom (see Figure 1).
These are the goals, then, to which tax - and other government policy must adhere.
III. APPLYING TAX POLICY TO SOCIAL GOALS
In applying tax policy to the goals of society, it is important
to recognize the two prime functions of any tax system. The first
function is to raise revenue to finance government expenditure
programs, and the second function is to serve as a substitute for
other government policy tools. These revenue-raising and nonrevenue raising functions are depicted in Figure 2.
Tax policies can be classified in line with the two functions
of taxes. Revenue-raising tax policies are concerned with designing
taxes with optimal attributes; whereas non-revenue tax policies are
concerned with achieving the objectives pursued by any government
policy instrument. 18 Revenue-raising tax policies deal with the
means used, while non-revenue tax policies deal with ends sought.

18

Shoup, for example, separated the criteria of public finance measures into those that
dealt with the attributes of the instrument and those that reflected the goals or objectives of
the policy tool. C.S. Shoup, Public Finance (Chicago: Aldine, 1969) c. 5.
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Although a tax system can be designed to serve revenueraising and non-revenue tax policies simultaneously, each of types of
policies has its own criteria. Consequently, in tax policy there are
two sets of concepts of economic efficiency and social justice,
relating to the revenue-raising and the non-revenue functions of
taxes, respectively.
A. Applying the Goal of Economic Efficiency to Tax Policy
The efficiency goal of revenue-raising tax policy is to raise
revenue without distorting the choices made by the economic agents
in society - in other words, the pursuit of economic neutrality (see
Figure 2).
The Functions of a Tax System

SOCIAL

GOALS

ROLES OF
TAXES

TAX
CRITERIA

ECONOMIC
OBJECTIVES

INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION
(VERTICAL
EQUITY)

Figure 2

RESOURCE
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When taxes interfere with economic decisions, they alter
resource allocation. If the choices were efficient to start with,
households and businesses incur an additional burden besides the
payment of the tax. As a result, society gives up more in economic
terms than the government receives. The consequent reduction in
economic welfare is called the excess burden of taxation. The aim
is to minimize these tax-induced excess burdens.
The non-revenue tax policy objective of economic efficiency
is directed towards correcting any pre-tax misallocations in resources
and encouraging socially desirable activities. Thus, economists do
not consider it "odd that a neutral tax base should be advocated by
some of the same individuals who advocate an investment tax credit
as a means of encouraging greater economic growth."19 The
distinction between the two concepts of efficiency is very important
because it eliminates spurious
reasoning and averts misunderstanding
20
analysis.
policy
tax
in
B. Applying Tax Policy to the Goal of Social Justice
The goal of social justice requires a fair tax. Fairness in
taxation is not only elusive, but its acceptable form must rest on the
uncertain consensus of changing contemporary opinion. As we have
seen with the goal of economic efficiency, much ambiguity and
confusion can be avoided by separating concepts of fairness into
those that bear on the revenue-raising function of taxes and those
that do not.
According to Rawls, fair taxation requires that "the burden
of taxation is ... justly shared,"21 and that taxes are used "to correct

the distribution of wealth."22

19

J. Bossons, 'The Nature of a Comprehensive Tax Base as a Tax Reform Goal" (1970)
8 J. Law & Econ. 327 at 334.
201bid at 332.
21

Rawls, supra, note 10 at 278.

22

Tbid at 277.
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The first of these two concepts is often referred to as tax
equity and applies specifically to the act of raising revenue (see
Figure 2). The raising of revenue in itself, according to O'Kelley,
"serves no just purpose, but rather is constrained by requirements of
justice."23 Tax equity, then, is conceptually similar to economic
neutrality - both seek to raise revenue with the least distortion of
existing conditions.
According to the Hon. Michael Wilson, Minister of Finance,
"the tax system must ensure fair sharing of the tax burden among
taxpayers. This means that the tax system should treat people in
similar circumstances in the same way."24 And according to the
Royal Commission on Taxation, tax equity also requires "that those
in different circumstances bear appropriately different taxes."25 The
first of these fairness essentials is horizontal tax equity, and the
second is vertical tax equity (see Figure 2).
The second of Rawls's concepts of tax fairness mentioned
above, the proper distribution of income, is often referred to as
vertical equity. Note that a distinction is being made, here, between
vertical equity and vertical tax equity, the former referring to the
non-revenue tax policy objective of fairness in the redistribution of
income, and the latter to fairness in the raising of tax revenue (see
Figure 2).
In principle, the goal of vertical, or distributional, equity
parallels the non-revenue tax policy objective of economic efficiency,
in that both are designed to correct pre-tax conditions, one in the
distribution of income and the other in the allocation of resources.
Personal views on vertical equity range from accepting
whatever the free market yields, to the position that income should
be distributed equally. Most views fall between these extremes and
include such goals as the maximization of total utility (or income) in
society and the maximization of the welfare of worst-off individuals

23

0'Kelley, supra, note 11 at 31.

24

Guideliws, supra, note 14 at 3.

25

Report, vol. 1, supra, note 16 at 5.
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as advocated by Rawls. 26 In Canada, it may be safe to say, an
overwhelming majority are likely to agree with Finance Minister
Wilson that those with "inadequate income" deserve special
consideration and that fairness requires that we "recognize the
position of those most in need. ''27 That is, the prime concern is
redistributing income to the poor, and not an overall reduction in
inequality.
It is very important to note that it is not the exclusive
function of the tax system to provide vertical equity in the
distribution of income. This objective can be achieved by a variety
of non-tax alternatives, principally government transfer payments.
On the other hand, tax equity is a necessary attribute of every tax.
Revenue raised for any purpose must be raised fairly and equitably
for social justice to prevail. As the Royal Commission on Taxation
noted, even "if the "ideal" system of transfer payments were
instituted, Canada could not achieve an equitable fiscal system by
reducing the progressiveness of the tax system and substituting a
more progressive allocation of benefits. A fiscal system in which
taxes were proportionate to income and redistribution was achieved
greater benefits to those
solely through the provision of relatively
28
unfair."
be
would
with low incomes
The Royal Commission on Taxation was not the first to make
use of this distinction in analyzing taxes. Nearly a hundred years
ago, Wagner made a very convincing argument for viewing fairness
in taxation from these two perspectives. In his words,
there exists a 'just" taxation both from the purely financial and from the social
The
welfare point of view - only it means something different in the two cases ....

26

Rawls, supra, note 10.

27

Guidelines, supra, note 14 at 5.

28

Report, vol. 2, supra, note 16 at 261.
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two points of view imply different tax systems, but each of them is internally
consistent, 9logically rigorous and rational, and corresponds to the respective concept
of justice.

More recently, Musgrave, in his classic The Theory of Public Finance,
followed Wagner's lead by stating that "for the Allocation Branch,
the need for securing a cost distribution independent of the
particular resource transfer is the function and raison d'etre of
taxation," while taxes for the Distribution Branch depend on "the
desired type of distributional adjustment" and "the Distribution
Branch will disregard taxes collected by the Allocation Branch."30
In spite of the fact that there is nothing in the Report of the
Royal Commission on Taxation, either in criteria used or
recommendations made, to suggest anything other than a concern for
tax equity as defined here - that is, fairness in the raising of revenue
- the Commission's concept of equity was harshly treated by critics
as soon as the Report came out, mostly because they failed to
differentiate between the two concepts of vertical equity. Analysts,
such as Low-Beer, for example, simply equated vertical tax equity
with vertical equity and, not surprisingly, found the concept
wanting.3 1 In fact, we were summarily advised by Robinson that "it
may be best to ignore what the Carter Report says" about tax
equity-32 More detrimental to the survival of the two-dimensional
view of tax fairness was the advent of "optimal taxation" theory,
which attempts to balance vertical equity with economic efficiency,
ignoring the existence of tax equity, both horizontal and vertical. 33

29A. Wagner, "Three Extracts on Public Finance," Translation of extract from
Finanzwissenschaft in R.A. Musgrave & AT. Peacock, eds., Classics in the Theory of Public
Finance (London: MacMillan, 1958) 1 at 14.
30

R.A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) at 16,

31

F. Low-Beer, "Carter's Logic" (1967) 15 Can. Tax. J. 471.

32

A2. Robinson, 'The Concept of 'Equity' in the Carter Report" in A.J. Robinson & J.

21.

Cutt, eds., Public Financein Canada: Selected Readings (Toronto: Methuen, 1968) 27 at 30.
33A seminal paper on optimal taxation was: J.A. Mirrlees, "An Exploration in the Theory
of Optimum Income Taxation" (1971) 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175.
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Because optimal taxation theory is concerned with ends and not the
means of obtaining them, it is not equipped to deal with tax equity.
It is not that economists do not recognize, as one important
textbook in public finance notes, that "both the nature of the
process and the results are relevant in making an equity judgement";
it is only that "among economists, the question of equity often takes
on a very narrow meaning, referring to the distributional effects of
policy."34 Even the authors of the above words limit their analysis
to the one-dimensional view of equity.
Unfortunately, only sporadic use of the two concepts of
equity appears in current literature. For example, Menchik and
David use the two concepts of equity to resolve conflicting
interpretations of tax equity by separating the "structure" of a tax
from its role in solving "social problems." 35 Similarly, Pasquariello
uses the criteria of "progressivity" (for vertical tax equity) and
"distribution" (for vertical equity) to assess the justice of the U.S. tax
system.3 6 It would appear that most analysts have completely missed
the most important contribution to tax policy analysis appearing in
the Repot of the Royal Commission on Taxation!
In order to implement the concept of tax equity, in both its
horizontal and vertical forms, a precise definition of "similar" and
"different" circumstances is required. Unfortunately, there can be no
universal consensus on this. What is meant by similar is subject to
many interpretations. Since individuals are never the same in all
respects, any criteria used to identify similar circumstances will
invariably make unequal comparisons. On the other hand, if all
individuals were the same, comparison would become irrelevant. In
spite of these problems, there are a number of criteria that can be
used to establish characteristics of "similarity" relevant to tax equity.
First, both horizontal and vertical tax equity should be
derived using the same criteria: whatever determines "similar"

34

E.K. Browning & J.M. Browning, Public Finance and the Price System (New York:

MacMillan, 1983) at 9, 19.
35

P.L. Menchik & M. David, "Reply and Comment on Brown" (1983) 36 Nat. Tax J. 515

at 520.
36

R.D. Pasquariello, Tax Justice (New York: University Press of America, 1985).
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circumstances should also determine "different" circumstances. As
Musgrave and Musgrave say, both horizontal and vertical equity
"follow the same principle ... and neither is more basic."3 7 The
existence of vertical tax equity should imply horizontal tax equity.
Another important attribute of similarity is that the criteria
used must be universal, or broad enough, to prevent discrimination
or exploitation based on irrelevant characteristics such as race, ethnic

group, or social status.38 The analogy here is with the
generally
39
law."
the
before
treatment
"equal
of
principle
accepted
Third, the criteria of similarity must be clearly visible, readily
identifiable, and easily measured directly. In the words of Adam
Smith, "the certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in
taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable
degree of inequality ... is not so great an evil as a very small degree
of uncertainty."40

Fourth, although the concept of tax equity refers to persons
only, persons could be treated similarly either as individuals or as
members of a group. The most relevant group classification, for tax
purposes, is the family unit, since it is the family's circumstances that
most often matter and not just those of the individual who happens
to write the cheque to pay the tax.
Fifth, the time horizon taken in viewing similar circumstances
is also very important. Ideally, taxpayers should be treated similarly
across the tax-planning horizon of governments. If the government
is providing more services to meet the wishes of current taxpayers,

37

R.A. Musgrave & P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice,3d ed. (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1980) at 243.
38

Shoup, supra, note 31 at 36.

39D. Dosser, "Economic Analysis of Tax Harmonization" in C.S. Shoup, ed., Fiscal
Hannonization in Common Markets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) 1 at 20.
40 Quoted from A.D. Lynn, Jr., "Adam Smith on Taxation" in G.F. Break & B. Wallin,
eds., Taxation: Myths and Realities (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978) 44 at 45.
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then, according to Musgrave and Musgrave and Bird, it is these same
taxpayers who should contribute to financing the desired services.41
Finally, tax equity encompasses justice not only in terms of
obtaining fair results, but also in the application of fair rules of
conduct. Thus, Hayek argues that both ends and means are
important to tax equity, just as they are in other areas of justice. 4 2

C. Applying Tax Policy to the Preservation of Individual Rights and
Freedom
The social goal of preserving individual rights and freedom
has a limited role to play in the design of tax rate structures, the
subject of this paper, but is closely tied to the administration of the
tax and the collection process. It is important that taxpayers are
dealt with fairly and impartially by Revenue Canada, the collection
agency of the government. The Declaration of Taxpayer Rights was
issued by Revenue Canada, Taxation in 1985 to confirm these rights.
IV. THE CHOICES AVAILABLE
No decision on an optimal tax rate structure can be made
without a clear understanding of the types of rate structures actually
available and their desirable characteristics.
Tax rates are usually classified as progressive,proportional,or
regressive, depending on the ratio of tax to income. For example, a
tax is said to be progressive if the ratio of tax to income increases
as income increases. Similarly, when the ratio is constant at all
levels of income, the tax is proportional; and the tax is regressive
when this ratio decreases as income increases.
If the tax base is something other than income, however, a
tax classified under the above criteria may have to be reclassified.

41

The limitations of using lifetime comparisons are noted by Musgrave & Musgrave,
supra, note 37 at 104 and by R.M. Bird, "Does Canada Need Capital Transfer Taxation?" in
W.R. Thirsk & J. Whalley, eds., Tax Policy Options in the 1980s, Canadian Tax Paper No. 66
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1982) 358 at 361.
42

F.A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).
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For example, an excise tax levied on a given commodity would have
a proportional tax rate structure if the rate was set as a fixed
percent of price. Yet, the same tax would be progressive if
consumption of the commodity increased more rapidly than income.
Similarly, progressive or regressive tax rate structures could in fact
represent any of proportional, progressive, or regressive taxes.
Thus, we must differentiate progressive, proportional, and
regressive taxes from progressive, proportional, and regressive tax
rate structures. Although most analysts are aware of this distinction,
many still fall into the trap of not making it.
A subtle variation on this theme is that a progressive income
tax may be proportional on part of income, when that part increases
as income increases; such as, for example, the part of income that
represents the ability of the individual to pay taxes.
But this is not all. Because tax rate structures appear in the
statutes in a maiginal form, it is common practice to use marginal
rate profiles as a guide for classifying taxes. In consequence, some
analysts classify a tax as regressive whenever marginal rates decrease
with income. This can be very confusing, because when marginal
rates are falling, average rates may be rising. This means that while
marginal rates may indicate a regressive tax, average rates may in
fact indicate a progressive tax. And yet, tax rate structures cannot
simultaneously be regressive and progressive. Little can be done
about this ambiguity except to recognize the existence of the
different definitions of progressive, proportional and regressive, and
guard against misusing them.
Unfortunately, the complications do not stop here. By
introducing variations in the size and type of tax deductions, credits,
and surtaxes and making them increasing, decreasing, or constant, a
new set of meanings for progressive, proportional, and regressive is
created. For example, the burden of a progressive income tax with
progressive effective marginal and average rates (as they relate to
income) can be duplicated by combining proportional or regressive
statutory rates (as they relate to taxable income) with just the right
adjustments in deductions, credits, or surtaxes, separately or in
combination.
In fact, virtually any kind of statutory tax rate structure can
be devised to represent any given effectively progressive,
proportional, or regressive tax. This mechanical manipulation of
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form without changing substance is common, as for example when
flat-rate taxes are suggested as replacements for existing progressive
43
rates without a substantial redistribution of relative tax burdens.
In evaluating rate structures it is important, therefore, to beware of
using illusory statutory rates.
In conclusion, then, it is not possible to classify taxes as
progressive, proportional, or regressive without clearly specifying
whether the reference is to: income or some other base, marginal
or average rates, or effective or statutory rates.
V. ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE
A. Achieving Tax Equity: Equal Treatment of Equals
Tax equity requires that "the tax system should treat people
in similar circumstances in the same way."44 Whatever consensuses
exist in Canada on tax issues, the one most nearly universal is that
"similar circumstances", in tax equity, means similar ability to pay.45
Tax equity also requires "that those in different circumstances
bear appropriately different taxes." 46 Again, there is near-unanimous
agreement that a tax will be "allocated in accordance with ...
abilityisgreater the
to-pay principles" when the "average rate of tax ...

43Among examples of this are: M.A. Walker, On Flat-Rate Tax Proposals (Vancouver.
The Fraser Institute, 1983); R.S. Smith, "Base Broadening and Rate Changes: A Look at the
Canadian Federal Income Tax"' (1984) 32 Can. Tax J.277.
44

Guidelines, supra, note 14 at 3.

45

Report, vol. 3, supra, note 16 at 5: "In our judgement taxes should be allocated among

tax units in proportional to their ability to pay." Proposals,supra, note 14 at 6: "a fair
distribution of the tax burden is based upon ability to pay." Guidelines, supra, note 14 at 5:
"individuals with similar ability to pay should pay similar amounts of tax."
46Report, vol. 1, supra, note 16 at 5.
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greater the total income,"47 or, in other words, through the use of
an effectively progressive average tax rate structure.
In order fully to understand why the income tax, as the main
revenue-raising tax, should be progressive, it is important to
recognize that the income tax is not really a tax on income, but on
ability to pay. Thus, according to Bird, "the aim in devising an
appropriate income tax base is to hit on a formulation that serves as
an acceptable, and attainable, measure - or at least index - of
"discretionary economic power," "potential consumption," "ability to
pay," or whatever we choose to call it."48
Ability to pay can be measured by the income available for
discretionary use, defined by the Royal Commission on Taxation as
discretionary economic power. Income meets the criteria given
earlier for establishing similar circumstances, quite well: Income is
universal (we all earn or have access to varying degrees of it), can
be identified as easily for individuals as for the family, is directly
measurable, fits any time horizon desired, and does not conflict with
the ends and means of justice (at least no more than our socioeconomic system does). Moreover, once the concept of income has
been adjusted to exclude its non-discretionary component it fits
perfectly with both vertical and horizontal tax equity, since each
dollar of economic power, as measured by the amount of income
available for discretionary use, can be taxed at the same proportional
rate regardless of the level of income.
Whenever economic power increases more rapidly than
income, an equitable tax (one proportional to economic power),
when applied to income, yields a progressive average tax rate
structure. Tax equity, therefore, requires both a progressive income
tax and a definition of income that includes all net gain arising from:
the provision of personal services, the disposal or ownership of
property, the receipt of gifts or bequests, and the receipt of windfalls

47Ibid, vol. 3 at 10. See also Proposals,supra, note 14 at 6: "fairness also requires that
people with higher incomes ... should be expected to pay in taxes a larger share of their
income than persons with lower incomes. Guidelines,supra, note 14 at 5: "Canadians believe

that a fair income tax system must be a progressive one."
48

R.M. Bird, "Comments on 'Tax Arbitrage, Inflation and the Taxation of Interest
Payments and Receipts"' 30 (1984) Wayne L. Rev. 1015 at 1016.

594

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

26

NO.

3

and government assistance payments. 49 These gains can be in the
form of cash, acquisition of or changes in the value of rights to or
interest in property, benefits in kind, and personal use of property
that could have been rented to others. And, as the Royal
Commission on Taxation noted, it does not matter, in principle,
whether the income is realized or unrealized, earned or unearned,
in money or in kind, recurrent or non-recurrent, intended or
domestic or foreign, so long
unintended, anticipated or unanticipated,
50
power.
economic
to
as it contributes
B. Achieving Equity in the Distribution of Income
As to income redistribution, the concern in Canada is for
those who have "inadequate income", by which is meant, the poor
and needy.51 "Canadians disagree about the extent to which broad
equality of income is a desirable goal. Nevertheless, there is
on the need to help the poorest
undoubtedly strong social consensus
52
Canadians."
vulnerable
and most
However, apart from using negative rates, there is little that
the income tax system can do about poverty. For those poor who
pay little tax, simply removing their tax burden would accomplish
little. Furthermore, the tax system is able to deal only with the
symptoms of poverty, and not its causes.
The symptoms of poverty can often be tackled better using
non-tax methods such as social insurance and welfare programs.
Also, it may be preferable to remove some of the causes of poverty
by such (non-tax) methods as subsidizing investment in human capital
(education and training), reducing discrimination and unemployment,
and subsidizing daycare facilities for children.
49

Report, vol. 3, supra, note 16 at 40.

50

1bid at 25.

51
52

Guidefines, supra, note 14 at 5.

Royal Commission on the Economic Union & Development Prospects for Canada,
Report, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1985) (Chair- D.S. Macdonald) at 565.
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To transfer income to the poor, the effective tax rate need
not be made any more progressive than is required for vertical tax
equity (other than reducing the tax on the poor by increasing the
size of the basic exemption or some other such device). The
average effective rate of tax would have to be increased,-however,
to finance transfers or refundable tax credits to the poor.
If the objective is to reduce overall income inequality, then
the progressivity of the tax would have to be increased.
VI. TRADE-OFFS AND COMPROMISES
Since the raison d'etre of the income tax is to raise revenue,
the prime requirement of any tax rate structure is that effective
average rates be positive; and if the amount of funds to be raised is
high, the rates should also be high. For the tax rate structure to be
fair, or equitable, in its distribution of tax burdens, these positive
effective average rates must be progressive, ensuring that tax
liabilities remain proportional to ability to pay.
If one of the non-revenue functions of the tax system is to
redistribute income to the poor, then the tax system requires low or
zero effective tax rates at the lower end of the income scale. This
can be accomplished by reducing initial rates, increasing the size of
exemption, or adding tax credits. (The use of refundable tax credits
would effectively convert the income tax system into a transfer
system).
Only if the redistributive objective is to reduce income
inequality across the board does the effective progressivity of the
average tax rates have to increase. There are some who, like
Drache, argue that "the entire rationale 5 for
the progressive tax
3
system lies in the notion of redistribution."
For the tax to be economically non-distortive, only a zero
effective marginal tax rate will do. (A zero statutory rate might
work for those deluded into thinking that the statutory rate
represented the effective rate.) With a zero marginal tax rate there

53A.B.C. Drache, The Great Tax Rpoff (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1982) at 154.
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is no excess burden 4 However, a zero marginal tax rate has to
come with either a zero average rate or a regressive average rate
(decreasing at the rate represented by a rectangular hyperbola).

Taxpayer
A
B
C
D
D'

Table 1
Hypothetical Effective Marginal and Average Tax Rates
Income
Total Tax
Average Tax
Marginal Tax
$10,000
$
0
0 %
0%
20,000
1,800
9
18
30,000
3,900
13
21
40,000
6,300
15.75
24
45,000
6,900
15.3
20

Since revenue must be raised, a zero average rate is unacceptable;
and for equity reasons so is a regressive effective average rate.
Since a zero marginal tax rate cannot be adopted, a low marginal
rate may be acceptable as a second-best choice; and if neither is
possible, a regressive effective marginal rate combined with an
effectively progressive average rate may be feasible by reducing the
marginal rate at the upper end of the income scale. Table 1 uses
hypothetical progressive average and marginal tax rate structures to
demonstrate the fact that when average rates are rising marginal
rates will be higher than average rates. The table also shows that
while the reduction of the marginal tax rate for taxpayer D from 24
percent to 20 percent makes the marginal rate structure regressive
above $30,000, the average tax rate continues to be progressive,
throughout.
The lowered marginal rate not only reduces excess burdens,
but can also induce taxpayers to produce more income, as shown by
the difference in incomes between D and D' in the table. In the
process, total tax collected by the government increases. This
additional revenue could be used to finance transfers to the poor, or
to lower tax rates across the board, further alleviating economic
distortions.
54

See V. Salyzyn, The Economic Analysis of Taxes (Calgary: Detselig, 1985) c. 5.
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Yet another type of trade-off can be used to reduce the
excess burdens created by the high marginal tax rates associated with
progressive average rates. This can be accomplished by taking
advantage of the principle that an increase in the marginal rate for
any given tax bracket increases the amount of tax payable for all
taxpayers above that bracket without affecting their marginal rates.
The bracket chosen for the increase should be near the low end of
the income scale in order to increase tax liabilities for as many
taxpayers as possible. Ideally, this bracket should also include as few
taxpayers as possible, to minimize the excess burden created by the
higher marginal rate. Some of the additional revenue generated
could be used to provide tax credits to those in the bracket with the
higher marginal rate, to reduce their tax payable effectively to its
original position. The remaining revenue can then be utilized to
reduce marginal rates for all taxpayers.
Economic distortions can also be created by differences in tax
liabilities between jurisdictions, such as those between Canada and
the United States. In order to avoid this type of distortion, the
objective should be to avoid differential tax treatment. For this
purpose, any type of rate structure will do, provided it produces the
same effective tax liability at each income level in both jurisdictions.
The aim, of course, should be to get foreign governments to accept
our tax system, and not the other way around.
For influencing economic behaviour domestically, any type of
initial rate structure will do, again since, in this case, it is the
deviations from the basic tax (in the form of deductions, exemptions,
tax credits, or special rates) that induce taxpayers to alter their
decisions.
A tax system should be easy to administer and to comply
with, in order to enhance equity and efficiency. Administration and
compliance is substantially easier using proportional statutory average
rates with no exemptions or tax credits; the determination of net tax
payable is thereby greatly simplified. Since such a tax also has
proportional effective rates, it eliminates the practice of incomesplitting, and removes the need for income-averaging schemes and
inflation-indexing. A progressive effective average rate with a
proportional statutory average rate (and with a large, constant
exemption) would also simplify the calculation of net tax payable,
but not as much. Although such a fiat-rate tax would remove large
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numbers of individuals from the tax roll, and would simplify the
mechanical relationship between income and net tax payable for the
remaining taxpayers, it would still encourage income-splitting and
require some income-averaging and adjustments for inflation.
Political acceptability is an important determinant of tax rate
design. Progressive effective average rates with constant exemptions
and progressive statutory marginal rates appear very popular,
although a progressive tax with proportional statutory marginal rates
(a flat-rate tax) might not be entirely out of the question when
combined with generous exemptions (for the benefit of the poor)
and a more inclusive definition of income (to keep the effective
average rate progressive). Progressive effective average tax rates
with regressive statutory marginal rates would probably never
generate any political support, while a progressive effective average
rate structure with regressive effective marginal rates might be
accepted by some if supported by the illusion of progressive statutory
marginal rates. As shown in the final Part of this paper, even a
regressive tax (average and marginal) might be accepted, if combined
with progressive statutory marginal tax rates. (Political acceptability
seems to thrive on illusions.)
And finally, if the income tax is not the only tax used, then
the rate structure has to be adjusted by the extent to which the
other taxes deviate from the criteria of an optimal income tax rate
structure.
VII.

TAX RATES RECOMMENDED BY THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON TAXATION

The Royal Commission on Taxation recommended that
effective average rates be proportional to each taxpayer's net
economic power, and progressive to income.
Because the
Commission recommended against the use of exemptions and other
deductions, the statutory rates would have closely matched the
recommended effective rates.
The Commission made three adjustments to its "ideal" rate
structure, by: reducing rates at the lower end to compensate for
sales and property taxes, reducing rates for middle-income taxpayers
to make them more similar to the rates in the United States, and
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keeping the top marginal rate at a maximum of 50 percent (federal
plus provincial) in order to minimize disincentive effects. The rates
recommended by the Commission are shown in Table A-1 in the
Appendix.
VIII. TWENTY YEARS LATER
There are two major differences between the rates
recommended by the Royal Commission on Taxation and those in
effect now. One difference appears in the statutory rate structure
as shown by Figure 3 (based on Table A-1 in the Appendix)
Effective Mean Average and Marginal Tax Rates, 1984.
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Current statutory rates are relatively higher for middle-income
taxpayers than those recommended by the Commission, while the
rates for high-income taxpayers are a great deal lower.
T h e
second major difference arises from the effect that current tax
concessions have on reducing the effective rates of taxation.
Effective rates have not only fallen dramatically in comparison with
statutory rates, as shown in Figure 4 (based on Tables A-1 and A-2
in the Appendix), but they have also fallen primarily at the lower
and upper ends of the income scale, adding substantially to the high
rates of taxation of middle-income taxpayers.
Effect of Tax Concessions
on Effective Tax Rates, 1984
75'
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The net results of these effects are shown in Figure 5 (based
on Table A-2 in the Appendix). The figure shows that the effective
rates, both average and marginal, are extremely progressive up to the
middle incomes range and regressive for high-income taxpayers. This
is in direct contrast to the rates recommended by the Commission.
Effective Average and
Marginal Tax Rates, 1984
25,
cc

2o,

20.
ui-.

~Ca
I

10

I

I I

I

20 304050

100

I

I

I

I

200 300 400 500

Income in Thousands of Dollars

Figure 5
The illusion created by our existing progressive statutory rates
has completely hidden from view the effectively regressive nature of
our tax rate structure at high levels of income. This raises a number
of basic questions. Do we know what social goals we want to
achieve through public policy? How much consensus do we have on
these goals? Are we applying these goals to tax policy? Are we
applying them properly? Are we sufficiently aware of the various
types of tax rate structures available for our use? Have we chosen
the right ones? Do we recognize the trade-offs and compromises
needed? Have we made the proper trade-offs? Do we know what
we are doing? Do we care?
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APPENDIX
Table A-1
Federal Statutory Average Tax Rates'
Royal
19841
Commission 2
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1984 minus
Royal Commission

8.9
8.8
-0.1
14.0
14.0
0.0
16.7
16.9
+0.2
40,000
18.7
19.1
+0.4
50,000
20.3
20.9
+0.6
60,000
21.6
23.0
+1.4
70,000
22.8
23.9
+1.1
80,000
23.8
25.0
+1.2
90,000
24.8
26.1
+1.3
100,000
25.6
27.2
+1.6
150,000
31.4
30.6
- 0.8
200,000
31.4
30.6
- 0.8
400,000
37.1
32.3
- 4.8
600,000
40.1
32.8
- 7.3
1. Rates are based on single taxpayers, using basic exemptions.
2. The rates recommended by the Royal Commission for Taxation are adjusted to
1984 dollars and to the 1984 ratio of net federal tax payable to total income
assessed.
3. Income assessed in 1984 is adjusted by adding in one-half of net taxable capital
gains.
$10,000

20,000
30,000

Sources: Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1966) (Chair- K. LeM. Carter); Revenue Canada, 1986 Taxation Statistics (Ottawa:
Supply & Services Canada, 1986)

Table A-2
Estimated Effective Federal Mean Average Tax Rates (EEFMATR) and
Estimated Effective Federal Mean Marginal Tax Rates (EEFMMTR), 1984

Income Class
Lossto
$ 10,00020,00030,00040,00050,000100,000150,000-

$ 10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000

Average
Income'

Average
Tax

EEFMATR

Changein
Average
Income

Changein
Average
Tax

EEFMMTR

$ 4,354
$
43
1.0
14,746
957
$ 10,392
$ 914
24,663
2,521
9,887
1,564
34,372
4,307
9,709
1,786
44,049
6,262
9,677
1,955
62,568
10,353
18,519
4,091
117,625
22,915
55,057
12,562
168,254
34,585
50,629
11,670
200,000- 250,000
219,678
46,335
51,424
11,750
250,000 &over
500,433
103,114
280,765
56,779
I. Income is adjusted by adding one-half of net taxable capital gains and subtracting the dividend gross-up.
Source: Revenue Canada, 1986 Taxation Statistics (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1986)

